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: Admiral Kingsmill and the Early Years of the Royal Canadian Navy

Admiral Kingsmill and the Early
Years of the Royal Canadian Navy
Roger Sarty

Following is a background paper and the first of a series of historical documents assembled to support the creation
of a Ontario provincial plaque in honour of Admiral Kingsmill by the Ontario Heritage Trust. Further documents
with commentaries will be published in forthcoming issues to help mark the Navy’s centennial. Warm thanks to Beth
Anne Mendes, Coordinator, Plaque Programs, Ontario Heritage Trust, who managed the project and assisted with
the writing and editting, and to Dr. Robert Davison, Wilfrid Laurier University, who assisted with the research.

Introduction

C

harles Edmund Kingsmill was
the founder of the Canadian
navy. He was the principal technical
advisor to the Canadian government
in the creation of the navy in 1908-10,
and became the professional head of
the new service for its first ten years,
1910-1920. The government selected
Kingsmill because of his naval
expertise. He repeatedly called upon
this expertise during the challenging
period of political controversy and
limited resources that attended
the navy’s birth and threatened to
destroy the young service.1
Kingsmill’s expertise came from
nearly 40 years of service as an
officer in Britain’s Royal Navy, the
world’s strongest and arguably
most effective fighting sea service
at the time. He served on most
types of warships in most parts of
the world. Although Kingsmill, at
just 14 years of age, left his native
Ontario to join the Royal Navy as
a midshipman, his allegiance and
outlook was Canadian. He showed a
deep understanding of the distinction
between British Empire and Canadian
interests in maritime armed forces at
a time when that distinction was
anything but clear. Kingsmill, with
his firm grasp of the practical needs

of maritime sovereignty and security,
and understanding of the Canadian
political and social situation, did
much to clarify that distinction, and
acted effectively to advance Canadian
interests.

Background

K

ingsmill was the grandson of
William Kingsmill, an officer
in the British regular army who had
served in the Peninsular campaign
against Napoleon. In 1833, while
on service in the British garrison
in Upper Canada, William retired
from the army to settle in the new
country. He held a number of civil
government posts and was ultimately
postmaster at Guelph, Ontario. In
1837-38 he came out of active militia
service to organize units to counter
the rebellion led by William Lyon
Mackenzie and guard the Niagara
frontier against intervention by
American sympathizers. William
Kingsmill’s seventh child was John
Juchereau Kingsmill (1829-1900),
who became a prominent lawyer in
Guelph. He was Crown Attorney
from 1856-1866, and in 1867 was
appointed judge of Bruce County.
John Juchereau’s first child, Charles
Edmund, was born in Guelph on 7
July 1855.
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Young Charles attended Upper
Canada College in Toronto, as his
father and uncles had before him.
In September 1869, he travelled to
England to train as an officer cadet
in the Royal Navy, as a nominee of
the then governor-general of Canada,
Lord Lisgar. At that time it was not
uncommon for Canadians wishing
to become professional (ie. full-time)
members of the armed forces, to join
the British services. Canadians –
considered British citizens who lived
overseas – had the right to join the
British armed services on much the
same basis as residents of the British
Isles.

Establishment of the
Canadian Navy

B

y about the mid-19th century
Britain determined that its selfgoverning colonies should become
more responsible for their own
defence. This was one of the main
reasons why the government in
London promoted confederation of
the British North American colonies
into the new “dominion” of Canada
in 1867. The issue, however, was
land forces, not naval forces. Canada
began to establish its first small units
of regular troops in 1871, the year
in which the last of British army
75
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garrisons on station in central
Canada withdrew.
There was no question of
Canada raising its own naval
forces. 2 In the negotiations
on defence at the time of
Confederation, Britain promised
continued naval protection.
The Royal Navy retained its
dockyards at Halifax, Nova
Scotia, and Esquimalt, British
Columbia, to support warships
of the North America and West
Indies station and the Pacific
station that operated regularly
in Canadian waters.
By the early 20th century
Britain looked to its self-governing
colonies for naval assistance to
meet increased international
rivalry. Because of that rivalry
the Royal Navy concentrated its
fleet in European waters, closed
the dockyards at Halifax and
Esquimalt, and removed the
warships permanently stationed
in the western Atlantic and
eastern Pacific at the end of
1904. Canada’s prime minister,
Sir Wilfrid Laurier, faced sharp
disagreement between Englishspeaking Canadians who
advocated defence cooperation
with Britain, and French-speaking
Canadians who believed that any
form of naval initiative would
be ultimately controlled by the
British Admiralty which would
draw the country into every
British conflict overseas. Laurier’s
compromise was to develop the
government’s civil marine fleet,
and particularly the Fisheries
Protection Service, into a national
navy for the defence of the
oceans adjacent to the country’s
coasts. The dockyards at Halifax
and Esquimalt, which Canada’s
department of Marine and Fisheries
took over, were a valuable resource.
Still, the government needed an
experienced senior officer to lead the
effort, specifically someone who was
sensitive to Canadian demographics,
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss1/9
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Admiral Sir Charles Edmund Kingsmill

politics and requirements. Laurier
selected Kingsmill, whose success in
the Royal Navy was well known, and
whose family was active in public life
and sympathetic to the Liberal party.
In 1908 Kingsmill retired with
the rank of rear-admiral from the

Royal Navy to take command of
the Canadian government’s civil
fleet and improve the very basic
program of naval training already
started in the largest of the armed
fisheries protection steamers,
Canadian Government Ship
Canada. In 1909, Britain was very
concerned about German naval
expansion. This threat prompted
English-speaking Canadians to
demand that Canada must do
more, and Kingsmill produced
a plan for a modest Canadian
naval service. Advice from
Britain resulted in the Laurier
government quickly establishing
the new Canadian Navy 3 in
1910, with plans for a larger fleet
than Kingsmill’s scheme, but it
was a logical development of
his plan. The Naval Service Bill
was introduced into the House
of Commons in January 1910. It
received Royal Assent on 4 May
1910 and created a department
of the naval service under the
minister of Marine and Fisheries.
A director of the naval
service was provided for in the
naval act, to be the professional
head of the service, preferably
with a rank not lower than
that of rear-admiral. Charles
Edmund Kingsmill became
the first director of the naval
service and would serve until
his retirement in 1920. Kingsmill
firmly grasped the possibilities
for a Canadian navy that,
although built on British models,
would be shaped by Canada’s
particular maritime interests,
such as the close protection
of the coastline and ports, the
gathering of marine intelligence
for the government in Ottawa,
and the enforcement of fisheries
regulations. He understood how
those interests differed from Britain’s
larger international concerns, such
as the defence of shipping around
the world that supplied the British
economy, a global mission that
2
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precluded attention to more local
Canadian needs.
Almost immediately in 1910
intense division between English and
French speaking opinion in Canada
slowed down the development
of the new navy. In 1911 when
Robert Borden’s Conservatives came
into power they stopped all naval
development, slashing the budget
and ending recruitment of personnel.
Kingsmill was bitterly discouraged,
but remained a loyal and devoted
public servant. He never spoke
out in public and scrupulously
respected the British principle of
the supremacy of the civil authority
over the military, a principle that
was strongly embedded in Canadian
practice.4 Kingsmill used his energies
to press forward with war planning
and such training as was possible
with the resources he had available.
He gave particular priority to the
training of young Canadian officer
cadets, as they were the hope for
the future of the service. The Royal
Naval College of Canada, established
at Halifax early in 1911, remained
open to receive new classes each year
despite the severe budget cuts. The
plan was that the cadets, after the two
years of work ashore at the College,
would then receive sea training in
two cruisers, HMCS Niobe on the
Atlantic coast, and HMCS Rainbow on
the Pacific, whose purchase from the
Royal Navy Kingsmill had arranged
in 1910. These ships could not get
to sea however, as the budget cuts
left too few personnel to crew them.
Kingsmill therefore obtained places
for the cadets on British warships.
Although the Canadian navy
had shrunk to only 350 personnel,
when war broke out in August 1914
the service was able to implement
basic coast defence measures thanks
to the planning and preparations
Kingsmill had organized. Britain
provided large warships for offshore
defence. With assistance from British
and Newfoundland personnel
and Canadian volunteers, the two
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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Top: Canadian Government Ship Canada as she appeared when
completed by her British builders, Vickers Sons and Maxim, in 1904.
Above: HMS Niobe arriving at Halifax, NS, 21 October 1910 to being
service as the first of “His Majesty’s Canadian Ships.”

Canadian cruisers were able to
get to sea to join the British forces
in protecting shipping in North
American waters. Eventually the
Naval Service recruited over 9,600
officers and ratings during the course
of the War.
In 1915 Germany began to use
submarines to attack British shipping.
The large British and Canadian
warships were vulnerable to
submarine attack, but the Royal Navy
had no anti-submarine warships to
spare. Kingsmill never relented in his
pressure on the Royal Navy to more
effectively assist in Canadian waters,
but as it became clear the British
were unable to adequately counter

the German submarines hunting in
British waters, he led efforts to use
any and all Canadian resources.
The navy took up government and
civilian ships that had the speed
and sea keeping qualities needed
for anti-submarine duties, armed
these vessels, and hurriedly trained
Canadian volunteers to crew them.
In 1917-1918 the Canadian navy
department worked with the British
Admiralty to build a 160 small antisubmarine vessels in Canada, and
Kingsmill persuaded the Admiralty
to allocate many of these to expand
the Canadian force. In these efforts,
Kingsmill took care not to disturb the
training of the young Canadian officer
77
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He died in 1935 at his summer home
on Grindstone Island, near Portland,
Ontario and is buried in Emmanuel
Anglican Cemetery, Portland.

Notes
1.

HMCS Rainbow at Esquimalt, BC.

cadets, leaving them to continue to
serve in major British warships in
more active theatres. He used his
connections to find experienced
Royal Navy officers, many of them
retired, to organize and command
the new small-ship anti-submarine
flotilla.
Throughout the war, Kingsmill
resisted Royal Navy efforts to control
operations at Canadian ports, which
were vital for the shipment of troops
and war material to the United
Kingdom. Using the experienced
former Royal Navy officers he had
invited into Canadian service, he
strengthened the navy’s coastal
commands and intelligence gathering
organization to better assert Canada’s
authority, and work on a more equal
basis with Britain. The Canadian navy
was thus able to take an effective part
in cooperation with the American
and British navies, in the defence
of shipping in the western Atlantic
when large German submarines
crossed the ocean in the summer
and fall of 1918. This experience
convinced even Conservative Prime
Minister Robert Borden (1911-1920)
that the country required the navy the
Laurier government had established
with Kingsmill’s advice.
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss1/9
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Kingsmill’s Legacy

A

t the time of Kingsmill’s
retirement in 1920, the small
staff of experienced ex-Royal Navy
officers he had assembled in Ottawa
was developing detailed plans for
the navy’s future on the basis of the
experience of 1914-18. Government
cuts to military spending in the
1920s made these plans largely
theoretical, but they became the
basis for rebuilding the navy in the
late 1930s and the foundation for the
massive expansion of the service in
the Second World War. That growth,
and the significant Canadian naval
contribution to the western alliance
in the early Cold War would be led
by Canadian naval officers to whose
recruitment and training Kingsmill
had devoted such attention.
During the course of his
expansive career Kingsmill was
well-recognized for his impressive
service and contributions. He was
made an Officer of the French Legion
of Honour and a Grand Officer
of the Crown of Italy. In 1913, he
was promoted on the British Royal
Navy’s retired list to vice-admiral,
then to full admiral in 1917. He was
knighted by King George V in 1918.

2.

3.

4.

For further reading: Gilbert Norman
Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada; Its
Official History: Vol.I. Origins and Early
Years (Ottawa: King’s Printer, 1952).
Contains much information still not
readily available in any other published
source; Michael L. Hadley and Roger
Sarty, Tin-Pots and Pirate Ships: Canadian
Naval Forces and German Sea Raiders
1880-1918 (Montreal and Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1991).
Incorporates military and political history
scholarship published since Tucker’s
volume appeared, and archival material
from Canadian, British, U.S. and German
archives to which his team did not have
access; Richard H. Gimblett, “Admiral
Sir Charles E. Kingsmill: Forgotten
Father,” in Michael Whitby, Richard H.
Gimblett and Peter Haydon, eds., The
Admirals: Canada’s Senior Naval Leadership
in the Twentieth Century (Toronto:
Dundurn Press, 2006), 31-53. The fullest
biographical account of Kingsmill;
Roger Sarty, The Maritime Defence of
Canada (Toronto: Canadian Institute of
Strategic Studies, 1996). Contains essays
on the origins of the navy, the navy and
development of Canadian sovereignty,
and the defence of the Pacific coast in the
era of the First World War that shed light
on Kingsmill’s role.
In 1881, there was an early attempt to
establish a Canadian navy, when the
young country acquired a steam-powered
wooden vessel, HMS Charybdis from the
Royal Navy as a training ship. The vessel,
however, proved to need such expensive
repairs that the Canadian government
returned her to the British.
The service became the Royal Canadian
Navy (RCN) in 1911 when King George
V granted permission to add the pre-fix
“Royal.”
Kingsmill was a prolific correspondent
on professional matters in letters and
memoranda that survive in the records of
the navy, and the papers of such public
figures as Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Sir Robert
Borden, and Louis-Philippe Brodeur,
held at Library and Archives Canada and
other Ottawa area archives. He was not
shy about expressing his views, but did
so only to other officials and his political
masters. An accurate summation of
Kingsmill’s place in published historical
literature is the sub-title of Richard
Gimblett’s biographical article: ‘Forgotten
Father’ of the navy.
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Document

Kingsmill’s plan for the Canadian Navy, 1909
Officer Commanding Marine Service of Canada to Minister of Marine
and Fisheries, 19 April 1909, extracts (Library and Archives Canada,
Record Group 24, Volume 3830, file NS 1017-1-1)

Editor’s note: The file copy of the proposal for Canadian naval development that
Kingsmill drafted in response to the House of Commons resolution of 29 March 1909
that called for the “speedy” creation of a naval service. To note is the priority Kingsmill
gives to fisheries protection, long the issue of maritime security that had most concerned
the Canadian government, and the need to build the navy on the foundation of the
government’s existing marine resources. These had long been the essential elements
in the Laurier government’s policy that Kingsmill had been hired to develop. Also
significant is the priority Kingsmill gives to the acquisition of “two small cruisers”
from Britain to serve as training vessels and to strengthen fisheries protection. At this
time the Admiralty’s advice, given to Australia in 1908, was that the dominions should
limit themselves to the smallest classes of warships, torpedo boats and destroyers, purely
for coastal defence. The “small cruisers” of the Sirius class Kingsmill recommends
were, at 3400 tons displacement, more than three times as big as the largest destroyers,
and unlike the destroyers had full ocean-going capabilities, together with excellent
accommodation for training that the destroyers lacked. This recommendation was the
genesis of the policy carried out by the Canadian government in 1910 with the purchase
of the British cruisers Rainbow, which was of the Sirius type, for the west coast, and
the much larger Niobe for the east coast. Those cruisers embodied the idea, planted
by Kingsmill, that the Canadian navy must, in order to exercise effective control over
the country’s ocean frontiers, have an ocean-going capacity.
Officer Commanding
Marine Service of Canada
Ottawa, April 19, 1909
Sir,
It is with a strong feeling of diffidence
that I submit, singlehanded, a scheme
of Naval Defence for Canada, and
wish to say that my views are given
after due consideration of the fact that
monetary contribution alone is out of the
question, and that we must develop our
Naval assistance to the Empire with this
end always in view, that the Canadian
Navy is to be under the control of the
Dominion Government, the question of
its disposition in the even of War being a
matter for those in authority at the time;
also that at an early date we must use
the newly started Naval Service for the
Protection of our Fisheries, in fact, that
Fisheries Protection and Training go hand
in hand, thus using the appropriation
for the former in carrying out the latter
which , of course, will be a considerable
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assistance and in the end a better use will
have been made of the money.
Understanding that the above is the
plan on which you wish me to work, I
submit the following:
A. The first, and one of the principal
things Canada should do for the
defence of the Empire and for her
own benefit, is the provision of proper
Dock accommodation and the proper
defence of her already fortified Ports.
The necessity for this is so apparent that
I do not enter in explanation.
1. Halifax and Esquimalt [ink insertion:
“or a properly fortified Port on Pacific
Coast”] should have their Dry Docks
brought up to date and their Machine
Shops kept in working order either by
Government or by subsidizing private
Concerns. A dock should be built at
Quebec and at Yarmouth, Nova Scotia,
and the latter fortified and made a Naval
Base. I will call these our Naval Bases.
2. The proper defence of these Naval
Bases should be undertaken; I am not

referring to the forts, now, but to the
narrowing of the Navigable Channel by
sinking obstructions in time of War, or
by properly organized boom defence.
3. The Establishment of Examination
Service: this would come under the
Military Authorities, but the Vessels used
would belong to Naval Department. (I
may point out here that this one matter
shows how desirable it is that we should
have Interdepartmental Committees.)
4. The proper organization of our
Coastal Signal Service and the
connecting up by wire of all important
observing Stations. This is a very
important matter – in Great Britain it is
undertaken by the Coast Guard and the
Government Telegraph Department,
(with headquarters at the General Post
Office).
5. A well organized Signal Service is of
the greatest assistance and positively
necessary in the even of War, for
many thousands of money could be
wasted by false reports and much
distress caused without burning any
power. A Hostile Cruiser would have
to be carefully watched, and our scouts
reporting her whereabouts by wireless
would need good assistance from
shore stations in directing the proper
disposition of the Defence.
B. Turning now to Naval Training in
conjunction with Fisheries Protection,
and considering British Columbia first:
1. We have there a very important
Industry, and at present an imperfect
Protection. I would submit that we
should, if possible, obtain from Great
Britain two small cruisers, fairly up to
date, capable of training say 200 men,
these ships to be bought in, becoming
in every way our property, sailing under
our Flag, but to be officered and partly
manned by Royal Navy, the officers and
portion of complement being chosen for
their capabilities as Instructors; these
officers and men coming entirely under
the Dominion Government and under
control of the officer chosen by the
Government as their Executive.
The training of Stokers and Seamen
could go on, and the promising Seamen
sent to England for a course in Gunnery,

79
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Torpedo and Signal School, and those
who were not doing well promptly
dismissed.
At Esquimalt we should establish and
up to date Signal School open to all
Merchant Seamen, particular attention
should be given to Telegraphy, Wireless
and other – this, so that in the event
of trouble in the East we could have
a good staff for use in our Mercantile
Cruisers, and be training a staff for our
Signal Stations.
2. At present, British Ships of War
visit the Seal fishing Grounds – this
duty could be undertaken by our ships
after the fact is recognized by Foreign
Governments that Canada has a
Navy, as also could the Police visits
of British Ships to British Pacific Ports,
be, in time, relegated to us. Training
for our people and an assistance to the
Imperial Government.
3. The Officer Commanding, or Director,
or whatever designation he will be
known by, should have, at Esquimalt,
an experienced Officer in General
Charge; for some time this officers
should be an Officer of the Royal Navy
with under him, as Understudy, an
Officer, Canadian if possible, but if not
one with Seafaring knowledge and the
necessary education, who has thrown
in his lot with us. A Staff also would be
necessary to keep proper returns, for
all Naval warlike stores, etc., should be
under the Officer Commanding for the
Dominion Government, and I cannot
too strongly advocate the system in
vogue in the Navy where red tape is
almost eliminated and fraud easily
recognized.
Note: I would submit here that the
Officer Commanding for Dominion
Government by styled DIRECTOR
NAVAL SERVICE [“Service” stroked
out and ink amended to “Forces”] and
generally addressed D.N.S.
4. In Great Britain training and education
of Seaman, who are destined to fill
positions of responsibility, commences
at a very early age. With us, at the start, it

https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss1/9
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would be necessary that all Candidates
should pass an examination, the
standard of which should be fixed by
the Civil Service Commission, and this
Examination should be entirely open to
all, Medical fitness and British origin or
Canadian Nationality being a sine qua
non.
C. To now turn to the Atlantic Coast:
1. [Original text: “I would advise that
here we should commence in the same
way, but that out training should be for
Torpedo Defence alone, at first.” Ink
amended to “I would advise that here
we should commence in the same
way, but that our training should be
for Torpedo Defence alone, from one
cruiser “Canada” at first in conjunction
with a training school on shore.” Then
this whole paragraph struck out.]
[Original text: “We should procure, to
start with, two Destroyers of not too
old a class, but of the best Sea keeping
qualities.” Ink amended to “We should
procure on loan, to start with, one
cruiser of Sirius Class and two Torpedo
Boat Destroyers.”] With these, and the
“CANADA,” officered by Royal Naval
Officers and Instructors, we should
train the crews of four Destroyers, and
at the same time [ink insertion: “partly”]
Protect our Fisheries on the Atlantic
Seaboard. With [ink insertion:”’Sirius’”]
two Destroyers and the “CANADA”,
[Original text “we would have one
Destroyer’s Complement to train” ink
amended to “fully manned we should
have a force of roughly speaking 300
men under training, a proportion of
them”] in Barracks on shore, these men
relieving those on board from time to
time so that all would get a share of the
Sea work.
The best of these men, as in case
of British Colombia training ships,
being sent to England to the Gunnery,
Torpedo and Signal Schools.
2. ...
3. Halifax, from the fact of its Dockyard,
and being an open Port, should be
Principal Naval Headquarters on the

Atlantic Coast, and like Esquimalt,
should be in charge of, for Executive
purposes, at first a capable Royal
Naval Officer, in time relieved by
his Understudy, who should be his
Assistant from the beginning; the
whole establishment being under the
D.N.S. who would be responsible to
the Government. At Quebec should
also be established a Signal Training
School and late on, as we progress, a
Naval Station.
4. We should at once commence
building Destroyers and [original
text:“Torpedo boats” struck out and
ink amended to “Cruisers”]. What we
should build, that is lay down, now as
soon as possible, would be: Two ocean
going Destroyers, vessels of 700 to 900
tons displacement, for the Atlantic: two
Coastal Destroyers, vessels of 270 tons
displacement, for the Pacific Coast:
Four Torpedo boats; the Torpedo boats
could be built, after a model has been
obtained, in Canada, to save sending
them round Cape Horn to British
Columbia.
Australia proposes to build:
3 Ocean going Destroyers, 1st class
vessels of 700 to 900 tons;
1 Ocean going Destroyer, 2nd class
vessel of 500 to 600 tons;
16 Coastal Destroyers (now call
1st class Torpedo boats), 270 tons
displacement
4 1st Class Torpedo Boats.
She has already ordered two ocean
going Destroyers, and the material for
a third, which is to be built in Australia.
We should need, eventually, all that
Australia proposes and our Cruisers
after that…

Roger Sarty is professor of history at
Wilfrid Laurier University and the editorin-chief of Canadian Military History.
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